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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE OUTSIDE
DIRECTOR - A MODEST PROPOSAL
VICTOR M. EALE, Il*
Perhaps the most controversial subject affecting American business in
the past decade has been the issue of corporate governance. The subject
includes a wide range of issues-corporate accountability is a prominent
example-which reach the very foundations of publicly-held corporations
and thus are of great interest to us all. Indeed, suggestions for reform are
emanating helterskelter from every possible source. These suggestions
often reflect the political demands and frustrations of a public whose un-
derstanding of the American corporation is primitive at best. Equally as
often, however, they consist of thoughtful proposals advanced by leaders
of business and government. The combined results are rather chaotic. It
is the purpose of this article, after recapitulating the recent developments
in this volatile field, to offer suggestions to relieve some of the chaos and
to institutionalize a rationale process of reform.
I. REcENT DEVELOPMENTS
In the early days of the business enterprise, ownership and control were
tied closely together. Gradually, businesses grew and ownership became
divorced from control. Stockholders ceased to be interested in entrepre-
neurship and came to think of themselves as investors, interested only in
profits. Control of the corporation was left to the management, with the
board of directors theoretically providing an effective check. The gap be-
tween theory and reality, however, was substantial. The managers of the
corporation often placed themselves on the board or filled the position with
quiescent, albeit prestigious, outside directors. The function of the outside
director was viewed as a sleepy one; that is, he or she was expected to stay
out of the way of management in exchange for the prestige afforded or
reinforced by the position. The outside directors were generally chosen by
the chief executive officer, who typically sought individuals with whom he
could feel comfortable. Most have been high-level business executives,
usually chief executives and chairmen, as well as lawyers, bankers, and
academicians.' The traditional quiescence of the outside director was exac-
erbated by a widespread lack of understanding about the precise duties of
the position, even assuming the director had any interest in fulfilling
them.2 The result of all of this was that the managers of the business, the
* Member of the New York Bar and general counsel for Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
and Peat Marwick International. The author expresses his gratitude to Robert C. Meade, of
the New York Bar, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
I See Soderquist, Toward a More Effective Corporate Board: Reexamining Roles of Out-
side Directors, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1341, 1350-51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Soderquist].
2 See Estes, The Case for Counsel to Outside Directors, HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1976,
at 127 [hereinafter cited as Estes]:
788 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
supposed servants of the shareholders, effectively became their own super-
visors and the control ostensibly exercised by the board of directors became
wholly formal.'
Today in the United States, a directorship is no longer comparable to
a hot bath. Demands and expectations have increased almost daily along
with a host of proposals for improving the accountability of the corpora-
tion. This change of attitude, which in its intensity and scope approaches
a revolution, has occurred because of a number of recent developments.
The most important developments have been certain highly-publicized
corporate failures and failings, the response of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Congress, the increasing imposition of legal
liability on directors, dissatisfaction with state regulation of corporations,
and a general transformation in our cultural consciousness.4
A. Corporate Failures and the Government's Response
The revolution in attitude regarding the role of the outside director can
be explained simply: revelation of widespread corporate malfeasance. To
paraphrase Dr. Johnson, the revelation of wrongdoing wonderfully concen-
trates the mind. SEC investigations disclosed powerful evidence, including
outright admissions by the corporations themselves, that many companies
were engaging in outrageous conduct. These corporations admitted that
they had participated in bribery or submitted to extortion abroad, kick-
backs and improper political contributions at home, the creation of use of
Since outside directors do not bring with them special expertise as outside directors,
receive no independent training for that role, and are themselves better oriented to
the CEO role than any other, they do not, as a class, have much to go on except
their own experience aided by such immaculate revelations as they may be blessed
with as the job progresses.
See also Soderquist, supra note 1, at 1349-50.
1 Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1307-08 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as Douglas]; Address by P. Loomis, SEC's Concern With Corporation
Governance, (Nov. 20, 1978) (Before the Financial Executive Institute, Pittsburgh, Pa. at 6-
7) [hereinafter cited as Loomis]. See generally A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). The attitude of quiescence which all too often prevailed
until relatively recently is reflected in the following oft-quoted comment of Lord Boothby:
If you have five directorships it is total heaven, like having a permanent hot
bath. . . . No effort of any kind is called for. You go to a meeting once a month in
a car supplied by the company, you look grave and sage, on two occasions say 'I
agree', say 'I don't think so' once, and if all goes well you get 500 pounds a year.
Chamberlain, Why It's Harder and Harder to Get a Good Board, FORTUNE, Nov. 1962, at 109.
See Shipman, The Role of the Outside Director Distinguished From the Inside Director,
reprinted in A. CoHFE & R. LOEB, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 259, 266 (PLI 1979). Sentiment on
the question of corporate governance is not unanimous. Two commentators recently criticized
various proposals being made in this area. For example, they asserted that it is doubtful
whether the objectivity of outsiders will be more beneficial than the detailed knowledge of
the company of those they will replace. They concluded that there is no convincing empirical
evidence that change in corporate governance is necessary or that the reforms suggested will




slush funds, and other illegal and immoral action. Something on the order
of 400 corporations acknowledged these practices. The admissions caused
a storm of protest both here and in Italy and Japan.
5
The post-Watergate discoveries followed in the wake of some spectacu-
lar bankruptcies, notably Penn Central, Equity Funding, and Sterling
Homex. In each there was evidence of management fraud and, hence, the
inevitable allegation that the directors were not adequately informed or
sufficiently vigilant.
The response of the Government was swift. In December, 1977, Con-
gress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.7 Sections 103 and
104 of the Act made it a crime for any United States company, public or
private (the latter falling within the Act's rubric of "domestic concerns"),
or any individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States, to use
"corruptly" instrumentalities of interstate commerce in furtherance of an
offer to bribe a foreign official or a foreign political party, party official, or
candidate for foreign political office in order to assist in obtaining or retain-
ing business for or with, or directing business to, any person. Section 102
imposes an even more direct duty upon the directors of the corporation by
requiring that "issuers" who have registered securities under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and who must comply with regular reporting require-
ments, keep reasonably accurate books and records and devise and main-
tain systems of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasona-
ble assurances that criteria in the statute intended to thwart the use of off-
the-book slush funds are met.'
5 See The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 6-7 (1977) (statement by P. Loomis) [hereinafter
cited as Metzenbaum Hearings]; Grienenberger & Harms, Corporate Governance Project
Stirs Controversy Over SEC's Authority, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14, 1978, at 25 [hereinafter cited as
Grienenberger & Harms]; Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held
Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1799, 1801 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Leech & Mundheim];
Loomis, supra note 3, at 3. In testimony before the Congress, SEC Commissioner Philip
Loomis responded to an inquiry about whether stricter standards for outside directors might
have prevented some of these instances of corruption:
Mr. Loomis. I think they would have been avoided to a very substantial degree.
One reason for thinking that is that in the cases that we looked into, the people
who were engaged in these practices were very careful to attempt to cover up what
they were doing and to conceal it, particularly from the independent directors and,
to the extent they could, from the accountants.
This indicated that at least they felt that they probably would not have been
able to do it, or, at least, their opportunities would have been reduced if the inde-
pendent directors had known about it.
Metzenbaum Hearings, supra at 11-12.
1 Metzenbaum Hearings, supra note 5, at 6.
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1977 Supp. I). See generally Baker,
Corporate Accounting and the Impact of the Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. (1979).
Section 102 provides in pertinent part:
(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12
1979]
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The SEC was even more active than Congress. It obtained consent
degrees requiring boards of directors to clean house and urged higher stan-
dards of conduct for outside directors.
An SEC staff study of the Penn Central collapse is illustrative:'
Pennsylvania Railroad and New York Central directors were
accustomed to a generally inactive role in company affairs. They
never changed their view of their role. Both before and after the
merger they relied on oral description of company affairs. They
failed to perceive the complexities of the merger or the fact that
appropriate groundwork and planning had not been done. After
the merger they claimed to have been unaware of the magnitude
of the fundamental operational problems or the critical financial
situation near the end. They did not receive or request written
budgets or cash flow information which were essential to under-
standing the condition of the company or the performance of man-
agement. Only in late 1969 did they begin requesting such informa-
tion and even then it was not made available in a form that was
meaningful or useful ...
The directors permitted management to operate without any
effective review or control and they remained uninformed through-
out the whole period of important developments and activities. 0
of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section
15(d) of this title shall-
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient
to provide reasonable assurances that-
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or
specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of finan-
cial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II), to maintain accountability
for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's gen-
eral or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing as-
sets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any
differences.
15 U.S.C. § 78m (1977 Supp. I).
The Commission recently issued rules to implement the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15570, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,959 (Feb. 15, 1979). The rules, which became effective March 23, 1979, prohibit the falsifi-
cation of corporate records and prohibit officers and directors of an issuer from making
misleading or incomplete statements to an accountant in connection with any audit, exami-
nation of financial statements, or filing of required reports. Id.
' SEC Staff Study of the Financial Collapse of the Penn Central Company, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,931 (Aug. 3, 1972).
11 Id. at 82,012-13.
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In other cases, the Commission has gone to considerable lengths in
insisting upon genuinely independent outside directors for corporations
whose managements have engaged in fraud or other wrongdoing.' In cer-
tain factual contexts, the SEC has delineated extremely high standards of
conduct for outside directors.
An example of the SEC's crackdown is the Report of Investigation in
the Matter of National Telephone Co.,' 2 where the Commission issued a
report severely criticizing the shortcomings of National Telephone's out-
side directors. The Report chided the Company's outside directors for their
inaction while inadequate information was given to the public. The Na-
tional Telephone directors knew of the Company's severe cash flow prob-
lems in the fall of 1974, its need for outside capital, and its obligation to
stop making new leases if the immediate future did not reveal new avenues
of financing. In spite of this pessimistic outlook, the Company's public
communications remained highly optimistic. The Report continued:
The directors have asserted that they relied on management to
make required disclosures and on company counsel to advise when
disclosures were required, and that such reliance was well-placed.
In general, outside directors should be expected to maintain a
general familiarity with their company's communications with the
public. In this way, they can compare such communications with
what they know to be the facts, and if the facts as they know them
are inconsistent with these communications, they can see to it, as
stewards for the company, that appropriate revisions or additions
be made.
Moreover, as here, when important events central to the sur-
"In the Equity Funding case, the SEC charged that management had engaged in a
massive and prolonged attempt to alter its books to show sales of insurance policies, receipts
of premiums, and the creation of assets and reserves, all of which were in fact non-existent.
Insurance policy files were set up in the names of fictitious persons, persons whose policies
had lapsed, and so forth. The company, among other things, sold the false policies, obtained
payments from co-insurers and re-insurers on death claims under the false policies, and issued
false and fictitious financial statements. As part of the resulting consent decree, the district
court was empowered to appoint an interim board of independent directors satisfactory to
the SEC in place of the existing board. SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., [1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,917 (C.D. Cal. 1973). In SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,807 (D.D.C. 1974), the Commission
alleged that the financial statements made by Mattel in certain filings and press releases
overstated Mattel's profits and understated its costs. In fine detail, the consent decree pro-
vided for a reconstituted board of directors. Among other things, Mattel was obligated to
appoint such "additional directors" satisfactory to the SEC as would constitute a majority
of the board. These additional directors were not to have or have had any affiliation with
Mattel; they would comprise a majority of the executive committee of the board and all of
the members of the financial controls and audit committee. Id. at 96,693-94.
1 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14380, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,410 (Jan. 16, 1978).
11 Id. at 88,880. See also Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corpora-
tion, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,219 (1975).
1979]
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vival of the company are involved, directors have a responsibility
affirmatively to keep themselves informed of developments within
the company and to seek out the nature of corporate disclosures
to determine if adequate disclosures are being made. This is partic-
ularly so since there may be a tendency for corporate disclosure to
lag behind developments, or, as here, there may be resistance on
the part of management to make full and fair disclosure.
Finally, the facts developed during this investigation demon-
strate the need for adequate, regularized procedures under the
overall supervision of the Board to ensure that proper disclosures
are being made. Such procedures could include among other
things, a functioning Audit Committee with authority over disclo-
sure matters, or any other procedure which involves the Board of
Directors in a meaningful way in the disclosure process. With such
procedures, the corporation's shareholders and the public should
be more adequately protected from haphazard or fraudulent dis-
closure.' 3
B. Increasing Legal Liability of Directors
Although they are not insurers, directors are fiduciaries. They have a
duty to avoid using inside information for personal advantage, to preserve
corporate opportunities, and generally to be loyal to the corporation and
its shareholders. Directors are also required to exercise reasonable care and
diligence in performing their duties.'4 Affecting the extent to which a court
may find that directors have fulfilled their duties is the business judgment
rule, under which honest errors of judgment are immunized.'5 The applica-
tion of these general principles in state courts has been the subject of
controversy, with some commentators raising doubts about the resolve of
those states that compete for corporations and the revenue they produce.'"
'1 One commentator has described the duties of directors as follows:
With respect to directors, they may be chargeable with a number of obligations
some of which are fiduciary and some of which may not be, including: (a) duty to
be competent; (b) duty to be reasonably informed; (c) duty to provide adequate
supervision; (d) duty to disclose conflicts of interest; (e) duty to reveal to the
corporation information material to its operation; (f) duty to avoid intentional
misconduct; (g) duty to avoid negligent misconduct; (h) duty to act primarily for
the benefit of the corporation; (i) duty to be fair in all dealings that involve the
corporation; (j) duty to refrain from competing with the corporation; (k) duty to
avoid seizure of corporate opportunities; (1) duty to be loyal, and honest and to act
in good faith, (in) duty to devote reasonable time and effort to the performance of
directional duties; (n) duty to keep abreast of the financial status of the corpora-
tion; (o) duty to investigate suspicious circumstances in the affairs of the corpora-
tion.
Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883,
887-88 (1976) (footnote omitted).
"5 See Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1603-04 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Corporate Director's Guidebook]; Soderquist, supra note 1, at 1344-46.
11 Some commentators assert that state courts have been reluctant to find directors
[Vol. XXXVI
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The main battleground in recent years has instead been the federal courts.One of the provisions of section 11 of the Securities Act of 193317 (the
'33 Act) provides for a civil cause of action by a shareholder against any
director of an issuer of securities in connection with any material misstate-
ments or omissions in a registration statement. Despite its due diligence
defense, section 11 has become a subject of increasing concern to outside
directors since the Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp. '5 decision eleven
years ago. Likewise, section 12 of the '33 Act'" provides for liability to any
purchaser of a security because of material misstatements or omissions in
a prospectus or oral communication offering a security. Although the Su-
preme Court has recently settled0 the question whether scienter is required
in an action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193421
(the '34 Act), other generalized provisions continue to impose high stan-
dards of conduct. For example, in Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship
Co.,22 the court held that under section 14(a) of the '34 Act, regulating the
use of proxies,2 the applicable standard of conduct for outside directors is,
as under section 11, negligence rather than the higher standard embodied
in the notion of scienter. The court there found that an outside director
was liable for negligently failing to demand disclosure of material facts in
proxy materials.2' In Securities Exchange Commission v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 2 a District of Columbia district court held that an individual, who
was a director-nominee and was nominating three other directors, had a
responsible unless there has been some form of active mismanagement. Because of this, some
directors are unable to discern from the case law what their duties and functions are. A factor
in this asserted reluctance has evidently been the fear of establishing disincentives to the
acceptance of directorships. Soderquist, supra note 1, at 1349.
17 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
,s 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
" 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
- 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
24 535 F.2d at 778. The dissenting opinion noted that there was no proof that the outside
director had been aware of the alleged misstatements and omissions and that the crucial issue
was whether or not he should have noticed the very technical defects. The dissent further
stated that "[a]s a non-lawyer and an outside director, Casey might easily be excused for
not having his antennae so finely tuned to semantic and formal 'defects'." Id. at 786 (Van
Dusen, J., dissenting).
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,583 (D.D.C. 1978). The court
found widespread violations of various provisions of the securities laws. For example, the
court found misleading a statement in proxy materials that the company had an audit
committee. Even though the company did in fact have such a committee, the committee
conducted no activities, held no meetings and, in short, existed in name only. Id. at 94,467.
Despite the numerous violations found, the court rejected the SEC's request for the appoint-
ment of additional independent directors and the appointment of an audit committee to be
composed of independent directors. Id. at 94,473-74.
1979]
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duty under section 14(a) to check the validity of proxy materials and to
correct statements which he knew or should have known were misleading.
Courtney Brown, retired dean of the Columbia Business School, has
well summarized the present exposure of the incumbent or prospective
outside director:
In recent years, a number of judicial decisions have enlarged the
requirement of prudence in a director. Federal courts have held
that board members must now be fully informed, ultra-careful
regarding possible conflicts of interests, and scrupulous not to use
inside information for personal benefit. They must develop more
than a cursory knowledge of the company and the field or fields in
which it operates. They must confirm the accuracy of important
reporting documents such as registration statements and proxy
material. Self-dealing, inside trading, and conflicts of interest are
subject to heavy penalty. Any one or several of these requirements,
if violated, can be accompanied by large liability."
C. Dissatisfaction With State Regulation and the
Transformation of the Culture
A festering disenchantment with state regulation of corporations lately
has broken out into the open and that, in turn, has had the effect of
focusing increased attention upon corporate governance. Professor William
Cary has argued that the states, in order to attract corporations as domici-
liaries, have been engaged in a race for the most minimal standards of
corporate regulation, citing Delaware as the leading example.2 Because
the states cannot be counted upon, Professor Cary proposed federal legisla-
tion to provide minimum standards for large corporations, including fed-
eral fiduciary standards for officers and directors and a requirement of
fairness for all transactions involving interested directors.? Other critics
have gone further and have argued for federal chartering and regulation of
corporations.
29
Finally, all of these developments have occurred against a broader can-
vas of general social and political change." Without attempting to examine
such a vast subject, it is useful to note that the convulsive social and
political changes since 1960 have had their effects in the corporate world
26 C. BROWN, PUTrrING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK, 38-39 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as BROWN]. See Estes, Outside Directors: More Vulnerable Than Ever, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 107.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663
(1974).
Id. at 702.
2' See Airlie House Symposium, An In-Depth Analysis of the Federal and State Roles in
Regulating Corporate Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 859 (1976).
11 See generally, D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976); R. NIS-
BET, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY (1975).
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too. The alteration in social attitudes regarding the rights of minorities and
women has had a direct impact upon the position of outside directors.
There have been calls for "more representative" outside directors, and
even for federally mandated constituency directors.
In the last few years, the boards of more and more companies have
acquired a majority of outside directors.3 ' The number of companies having
nominating committees with non-management majorities grew signifi-
cantly in 1978. Another development was the increase in the number of
female directors, those from academia, and those formerly from govern-
ment.32 Directors have been devoting more time to directing.3 A recent
survey by the New York Stock Exchange and the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries reveals that non-management directors constitute a
majority on about 80% of the boards of directors of 993 responding compa-
nies. The survey also showed that 963 of these companies had audit com-
mittees and 834 had compensation committees, both figures substantially
higher than in 1975.11
IT. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. Actions of the SEC
The SEC lately has been most active in the area of corporate gover-
nance,35 both by means of speech-making and rule-making. Some members
of the SEC have wondered aloud, however, about the limits of its author-
ity.38
1' Leech & Mundheim, supra note 5, at 1828.
32 Harris, "Independent" Panels of Corporate Boards To Tap New Directors are
Proliferating, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 14.
Mace, Designing a Plan for the Ideal Board, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 20-
21; Soderquist, supra note 1, at 1352.
11 [1979] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 492, at A-1 (Feb. 28, 1979). One case in which
reform was apparently lacking is reflected in the settlement between the SEC and William
F. Buckley, Jr. The SEC charged Mr. Buckley and others with violations of the securities
laws in connection with the affairs of Starr Broadcasting Group, of which he was chairman
of the board. Mr. Buckley is reported to have said that he relied as a corporate director on
materials prepared by others. Although "not always an epistemological optimist," he said,
he started out "on the assumption that these things are correct." Mr. Buckley described
himself as "someone who did not know until he heard the term for the first time in September
1974 that there was such a thing as '10-K'." Miller, S.E.C. Charges William Buckley: He
Agrees to a Settlement in Stock, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1979, at 1.
11 The Commission's interest in the subject of corporate governance is not entirely new.
As early as 1940 the SEC recommended the establishment of an audit committee composed
of outside directors. Loomis, supra note 3, at 5.
36 Unlike state corporation laws, the federal securities laws are concerned not with struc-
ture and substance but with full disclosure of pertinent facts. Thus there is a danger of going
too far in trying to peg corporate governance to the policy of full disclosure. See generally
Grienenberger & Harms, supra note 5. The Commission's General Counsel concluded that
the SEC has ample authority to require all public companies to establish an audit committee
composed of independent directors. Opinion of SEC General Counsel on the Commission's
Authority to Require Public Companies to Establish Independent Audit Committees. [1978
1979]
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Harold Williams, Chairman of the SEC, has made provocative reform
proposals. Williams proposed that boards of directors be truly indepen-
dent; that outside counsel, bankers and all suppliers of the corporation be
excluded from service on the board; that the only member of management
on the board be the chief executive officer; and that the chief executive
not be the chairman. He warned that federal regulation would be imposed
on corporations unless they voluntarily promoted a greater degree of ac-
countability. The large corporation, he stated, "has ceased to be private
property-even though theoretically still owned by its shareholders-and
has become, in essence, a quasipublic institution. '37 Therefore, he con-
cluded, corporations must assume their responsibilities.
3
1
In the summer of 1978, the SEC published certain important rule
changes relating to corporate governance. 9 One of the SEC proposals was
that the proxy rules would be amended to require the identification of each
director as a "management director", as "affiliated nonmanagement direc-
tor", or an "independent director". In the case of the second of these terms,
each proxy statement would contain a description of the nature of the
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,535 (March 2, 1978). Commissioner Loomis
agreed:
While the Commission has implemented [Section 14(a) of the 34 Act] primarily
by establishing disclosure requirements, the statutory provision is by no means
limited to disclosure nor have we limited it. We have, for example, provided Mar-
quis of Queensberry Rules for proxy fights and procedures for the submission of
stockholders proposals.
Proxy solicitation is an essential element of the process of corporate governance
in publicly-owned corporations. It is this process by which members of the board
of directors are chosen. The legislative history of Section 14(a) indicates that the
section was intended to provide for "fair corporate suffrage." Thus, there are a good
many things which we could do under the proxy provisions which would impact
upon corporate governance....
Loomis, supra note 3, at 3-4.
[1978] SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA), No. 437, at A-23 (Jan. 25, 1978).
Id. Other SEC Commissioners sounded the call for responsible corporate management.
Commissioner John Evans argued that there is a need for greater accountability and pointed
to the Penn Central, Stirling Homex, and Equity Funding failures as instances in which
directors and officers had been unable or unwilling to carry out their duties. At least a
majority of every board should, he stated, be independent, as should the chairman. The
executive, audit, compensation, and nominating committees should be dominated by outside
directors. [1978] SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA), No. 436, at A-12, 13 (Jan. 18, 1978). Commis-
sioner Roberta Karmel contended that the demands for corporate reform have increased
because of the apparent indifference of corporate management to economic and social prob-
lems and the lack of accountability for illegal conduct. Id. at A-14. In August 1978, Mr.
Williams repeated his proposals for reform of the board and stated: "I do not mean that all
corporate boards, constituted differently than I proposed, are necessarily ineffective. But I
do believe that boards can be more effective and that, in many situations, they do not
discharge their responsibilities to oversee the management of the affairs of the corporation."
Address to the American Bar Association, Section on Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, "Corporate Accountability and the Lawyers Role," reprinted in [1978] SEc. REG. L.
REP. (BNA) No. 465, at H-2 (Aug. 9, 1978).
11 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14970, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 81,645 (July 18, 1978).
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relationship for which the director was so categorized. The definitions of
these terms provided that a "management director" is an officer or em-
ployee of the issuer; that an "affiliated nonmanagement director" is a
former officer or employee, a customer, a supplier, outside counsel, an
investment banker, and the like; and that an "independent director" is an
independent'person not having any of the foregoing relationships. It was
also proposed that disclosure be made of whether or not the issuer had
standing audit, nominating, and compensation committees, the number of
meetings held by each committee, and the identity of the committee mem-
bers and their categorization under the terms discussed earlier. The Com-
mission stated that these three standing committees should normally be
composed entirely of independent directors.
These proposals evoked a storm of controversy, especially the categori-
zation of directors. The SEC therefore adopted the proposed rules in a
substantially revised form." The Commission abandoned the requirement
that directors be categorized. Instead, any of certain significant economic
and personal relationships which may exist between the director and the
company are required to be disclosed. The relationships include former
officers and directors, relatives of officers, customers, suppliers, outside
counsel, investment bankers, and the like. The existence or non-existence
of standing audit, nominating, and compensation committees must be
disclosed, together with an identification of the members, the number of
meetings held, and the functions performed by the committees. The num-
ber of board meetings held during the year must also be disclosed. If during
any particular year a director attended less than 75% of the aggregate of
the meetings of the board and the meetings of committees on which he
served, the director's name must be disclosed.
Even after enactment of these new rules, Chairman Williams has con-
tinued to exert pressure for change. "In January 1979, Mr. Williams re-
peated his call for a reconstituted board of directors.4 He asserted that his
original proposals were not an arbitrary governmental directive, but a
signal of the need for change in order to forestall just such government
action, which political pressures might otherwise generate."
Mr. Williams repeated his suggestion that the board be composed en-
tirely of independent, outside directors, save only the chief executive.43 In
11 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15384, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,766 (Dec. 12, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Directors Release].
11 Address to the Sixth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, "Corporate Accountabil-
ity-One Year Later" (San Diego, Cal. Jan. 18, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
11 Mr. Williams observed that a result survey showed shareholders generally are inter-
ested only in profits. Therefore, some other body, presumably the board of directors, must
assume responsibility for the actions of the corporation in terms of other than short-run
economic growth. Id. at 6.
'1 The Chairman stated that:
Members of management cannot be expected, as a general rule, to assess objec-
tively the performance of the management of which they are a part, the adequacy
of the performance of their superior, the chief executive, and similar issues which
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response to critics who contend that other management points of view are
needed on the board so that the chief executive does not intentionally or
mistakenly color the facts, Mr. Williams said that other management per-
sonnel should attend board meetings and make factual presentations, but
should not be actual members or participate in the decision-making pro-
cess." He went on to observe that it was especially important that the chief
executive officer not serve simultaneously as the chairman of the board in
order that control over the agenda, which is a powerful tool for domination
of the board, be kept out of the hands of management.45 He also empha-
sized the importance of functioning committees to effective corporate ac-
countability and proposed that there be a nominating committee com-
posed entirely of non-management directors.46
Even more recently, Chairman Williams urged securities analysts to
express their willingness to advise institutional investors on matters of
corporate governance that might affect their proxy voting decisions. 7 They
should tell the investors, who are increasingly reconsidering their adher-
entail an evaluation of their own fitness. They cannot realistically be expected to
measure and reward their own performance, ask themselves embarrassing ques-
tions, or fire themselves or the president who hired them.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 18-19.
The importance of control over the agenda "is analogous to the internal control sys-
tem's pivotal role in management's exercise of authority over the affairs of the corporation
itself." Id. at 22.
Professor Courtney Brown, like SEC Chairman Williams, argues that no members of
management should serve on the board except for the chief executive officer, who should
never serve as chairman. BROWN, supra note 26, at 109. Joseph W. Barr, a distinguished
business leader, opposes Professor Brown's suggestion. Mr. Barr believes that it reduces a
director's effectiveness to be also the board chairman because the chairman is associated with
management. The Professional Director: A Conversation with Joseph W. Barr, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS 48, 63 (Fall 1977) [hereinafter cited as Conversation]. Other authorities, including
the Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 15, oppose Professor Brown's position and
prefer a board with a majority of outsiders. The reasoning is that some management represen-
tation is essential and that the outside directors should be exposed to management personnel
who might become candidates for higher office, including that of chief executive. Corporate
Director's Guidebook, supra note 15, at 1624-25; Statement of the Business Roundtable, The
Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation,
33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2107-09 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Business Roundtable]. See Cohen,
The Outside Director-Selection, Responsibilities, and Contribution to the Public
Corporation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 837, 850-52 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
"' Mr. Williams stated that "a nominating committee, by which potential directors are
selected, is in itself a key element of accountability. In my view, this committee could become
the single most effective force in improving corporate governance because of its impact, over
time, on the composition of the board and on the succession of management." Williams, supra
note 15, at 23.
The SEC Chairman also noted that, although the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants recently decided not to compel public companies to establish audit committees
as a pre-condition to certification, it nevertheless repeated its support for the committee. Id.
at 28-29.
11 Address by Chairman Williams to the New York Society of Securities Analysts,
[1979] SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) No. 489, at A3 (Feb. 7, 1979).
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ence to the "Wall Street Rule",48 what they think about board membership
and structure.
The SEC has thus become deeply involved in the subject of corporate
governance and can be expected to continue its efforts to effect change in
board composition and performance."
B. The Work of the Senate Subcommittee
The Subcommittee on Citizens' and Shareholders' Rights and Reme-
dies of the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator Howard Metz-
enbaum of Ohio, has held hearings on the question of corporate gover-
nance. A wide variety of views were expressed on the general subject and
on the role of outside directors.5" The position of the Subcommittee has not
yet become clear, but it has been reported recently that the Subcommittee
staff has prepared draft legislation . 5 Apparently, the proposed bill, which
applies only to certain large corporations, outlines a director's duties and
specifies that directors may be found negligent if they fail to exercise
proper care in making inquiries when and if they have suspicions about
corporate conduct. A majority of the board would be composed of indepen-
dent directors, which would exclude former employees, outside counsel,
investmelit bankers, suppliers, and the like.52
C. Other Proposals
1. The Functions of the Board
State corporate statutes are notoriously vague as to the duties of direc-
tors. A few specific subjects are left to them and they are generally admon-
ished that the affairs of the corporation are to be managed by or under their
discretion. Outside directors are not expected to involve themselves in the
daily operation of the enterprise.0 Under these conditions, ensuring the
accountability of the corporation is difficult. Many have therefore sought
to define useful yet realistic functions for the board.54
As a matter of tradition and theory, the functions of the board hdve
been to establish corporate policies and strategies, allocate resources in
" The Wall Street Rule provides that investors should go along with management or sell
out.
" See Interview with Harold Williams, [1979] SEc. REG. L. REP. (BNA) No. 493, at AA-
2-AA-4 (March 7, 1979). The Commission has stated that it intends to issue a staff report on
corporate governance which will address important issues, including additional proposals for
rules or legislation. See Directors Release, supra note 40.
See generally Metzenbaum Hearings, supra note 5.
" Miller, At Odds Over Corporate Governance: Leaders Fail to Achieve a Compromise
on Legislation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1978, at F-1.
52 Senator Metzenbaum reportedly set up an informal advisory body composed of mem-
bers of various interested groups, but these individuals were unable to agree on the proposed
bill. Id.
Soderquist, supra note 1, at 1343.
" Id. at 1358-59.
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major corporate projects, select the corporate officers, and generally man-
age the corporation. 5 In truth, directors do not and cannot "manage" or
"direct" the operations of corporations in the strict sense.5" Management
runs the corporation. The fact is that, as Professor Myles Mace noted a
few years ago, the selection of officers and even of board members, the
formulation of policy, the allocation of resources and the evaluation of
personnel are all functions under the control of management.5 1 What
boards in fact do is give advice to the chief executive, serve as a kind of
disciplining force, and act in a crisis, for example, when the chief executive
unexpectedly dies.
The gap between the theory and reality of corporate direction is the
result of several factors. Because of time constraints alone, the typical
board is in no position to "manage" the affairs of a large corporation.
Board members have no staffs of their own and have limited access to
information. In the past, there has been a distinct tendency for boards to
include individuals who are economically or psychologically connected
with management, especially the chief executive.
58
Many commentators have therefore turned their attention to identify-
ing the functions outside directors can realistically perform while enhanc-
ing the prospect of corporate accountability.59 It should come as no surprise
that the single function most emphasized is the monitoring role."'
Unlike various other functions, monitoring can be achieved without
requiring an inordinate time commitment.6 ' Monitoring requires that there
be an adequate flow of information and that the outside directors be truly
independent of management.2 Thus, directors can provide advice to the
chief executive, authorize major corporate actions, provide a means for the
inclusion in decision-making of persons other than top management and,
55 See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation:
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAuLF. L. REv. 375, 376 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Eisenberg]; M. MACE, DIRECTORS-MYTH AND REALITY (1971) [hereinafter cited as MACE].
5' MACE, supra note 55, at 178-90; Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 376. Traditionally, state
statutes have provided that the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a
board of directors.
" MACE, supra note 55, at 184-90; Soderquist, supra note 1, at 1355. Professor Mace
himself has recognized the signs of improvement which others have observed. He pointed out
recently that chief executives and directors have increasingly become concerned about their
responsibilities and their attitudes have demonstrably been changing. Mace, The Changing
Role of Directors in the 1970s, 31 Bus. LAw. 1207, 1208-09 (1976).
" Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 378-84.
' See, e.g., Leech & Mundheim, supra note 5, at 1803-04.
'° See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973); Riger, The Lawyer-
Director-A Vexing Problem, 33 Bus. LAw 2381, 2385 (1978); Soderquist, supra note 1, at
1356.
" Commentators always must consider the effect their reform proposals would have upon
the time pressures facing outside directors. To increase drastically their time commitments
would be to change the nature of the position or to deter many qualified candidates from
accepting the position. See Soderquist, supra note 1, at 1357-58.
11 Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 438.
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most important, choose top management and monitor the performance of
the corporation under their direction.63 Professor Mace has proposed a
charter of duties which, although slightly more specific, likewise stresses
the monitoring role. 4
A rule requiring independence of only a clear majority of the board is
preferable to one requiring total, or virtually total, independence. The
definition of independence, however, must be strict. Officers, relatives of
officers, suppliers, and the like would be excluded. Some thought has been
given to the implementation in the United States of the two-tiered system
used in Germany. Under this system, one board concerns itself with man-
agement and the other with supervision. Professor Eisenberg argues that
a truly independent board with control over the proxy mechanism is prefer-
able. 5
2. Creation of Working Committees
In the past, committees, when they existed at all, too often tended to
be mere empty shells. An excellent example is the case of National Tele-
phone Co., which had an audit committee that never met. Attention has
thus centered on what committees a board should create, what the com-
mittees should do, and who should serve on them.
6
The latest SEC rules require the disclosure of information about stand-
ing audit, nominating, and compensation committees. In June 1978, the
New York Stock Exchange, at the behest of the SEC, implemented a rule
requiring all listed companies to establish an audit committee composed
entirely of directors independent of management.
7
In terms of corporate accountability, the most important committees
appear to be audit, nominating, and compensation. The Corporate Direc-
tor's Guidebook recommends that these "overview" committees be com-
posed exclusively of outside directors and, to varying degrees, unaffiliated
non-management directors, i.e., those who are not outside counsel, invest-
ment bankers, or suppliers. 6 One commentator has argued that the nomi-
nating committee should take control of the proxy process in order to
' See id. at 391-92.
, Professor Mace suggests that directors should be responsible to shareholders, select the
chief executive, evaluate the work of top management, review and approve major corporate
policies and projects, monitor the corporate financial structure, monitor top management
monitor, review and approve employee relations, manage the board, including selecting new
members, setting up committees and choosing outside auditors, and ensure compliance with
all applicable laws. Mace, Designing a Plan for the Ideal Board, HARV. Bus. Rav., Nov.-Dec.
1976, at 21-22. See Business Roundtable, supra note 45, at 2096-103.
See Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 404-14. See also Douglas, supra note 3, at 1314-17.
For a description of the advantages of effective board committees, see Leech & Mun-
dheim, supra note 5, at 1809.
'1 N.Y.S.E. COMPANY MANUAL, at A-29 (1978). See Business Roundtable, supra note 45,
at 2109-10.
" Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 15, at 1625-27.
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protect the independence of the outside directors.69 The audit committee
is intended to monitor the integrity of the corporation's financial informa-
tion used in decision-making and reporting to the public. The audit com-
mittee performs this function by reviewing significant financial informa-
tion, inquiring into the corporation's internal control and accounting prac-
tices, consulting with the inside and outside directors, and reviewing
changes in accounting principles.
70
3. Orientation and Information Flow
Certain authorities have urged that new directors undergo a thorough
orientation process. A new director would, for example, review the finan-
cial statements, meet with corporate officers, attend some meetings of
committees on which he does not serve, meet with the outside auditors and
regular corporate counsel, and assure himself that board meetings will be
held regularly. A new director should also satisfy himself that an agenda
will be circulated in advance, that dissent is acceptable, and that minutes
of meetings are kept and circulated.
7'
When Arthur Goldberg resigned from the board of TWA in 1972, he
suggested that outside directors be given a staff in order to avoid depend-
ency for their information on the management they are attempting to
monitor. He repeated and amplified his proposal at hearings of the Senate
Subcommittee on Citizens' and Shareholders' Rights and Remedies.
7
1
. The Goldberg proposal has been widely opposed on various grounds,
including cost, impairment of morale, and legal uncertainties. Its principal
weakness is the likelihood that a staff for the board would lead to dissen-
sion and divisiveness.73 Outside directors should instead obtain assistance
from the corporate staff and, perhaps when necessary in specific instances,
be able to employ their own counsel, accountants, and other experts.
7 4
6' BROWN, supra note 26, at 48-49.
TO See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., The Audit Committee (1977). See also Cohen,
supra note 45, at 856-57.
1' A new member of the board should always review the most recent financial data. A
thorough financial review would include inspection of the Form 10-K, Form 10-Qs filed with
the SEC, and a meeting with a company's financial officers. See Cohen, supra note 45, at
852-54; Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 15, at 1604-06.
72 Metzenbaum Hearings, supra note 5, at 98-118.
7' Blough, The Outside Director at Work on the Board, 28 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 202,
203-09 (1973); Conversation, supra note 45, at 62. Professor Eisenberg contends that the
Goldberg proposal is unsound:
Notwithstanding its logic, however, the Goldberg proposal is both unsound and
unworkable. Stripped of its trappings, it would create a shadow staff with an insti-
tutionalized obligation to second-guess the management, but with very limited
responsibility for results. Assuming that the directors are part-time, in cases where
the recommendations of staff and management diverged they would have little
choice except to adopt one set of recommendations or the other. Yet absent self-
dealing on the part of management, the board's staff could normally be expected
only to decide again-with much more limited facilities and feel for the business,
and at the price of additional expense and time-issues which management and the
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4. The Full-Time Director
Some believe that many of the problems facing the outside director
today can be alleviated, or at least diminished, if large corporations were
to rely upon "full-time" or "professional" directors. These directors would
be experienced individuals with no ties or obligations of any kind except
to serve several corporations as directors. The professional director is expe-
rienced, often a former executive, and yet has more time than most active
chief executive officers. Since he is not allied with management, he can
afford to be independent.7 5 In any event, however, it is unlikely that an
adequate supply of professional directors is available or sufficiently diverse
to make such a proposal workable.76
5. Representativeness
A persistent criticism of the outside director has centered upon his
background. Essentially, the criticism relates to the "old boy network,"
the feeling that outside directors are chosen by the chief executive primar-
ily from among his friends or colleagues. Plainly, a broader group than that
must be tapped. The Business Roundtable has identified the desirable
qualifications to be "integrity, independence, an inquiring mind, vision, an
corporate staff have already once decided. If the conclusions of management and
staff are the same, nothing will have been gained for this price. If they differ, it is
far from clear how the board will choose between them. In short, the proposal would
add a further and unnecessary level of decision-making to corporations which al-
ready tend toward overbureaucratization; would add immensely to the difficulties
of running the corporation's business; and would produce a wholly undersirable
diffusion of responsibility as among the executives, the shadow staff, the overseeing
committee, and the board itself.
Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 390.
U Cohen, supra note 45, at 849; Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 15, at 1627.
Robert M. Estes, former General Counsel, Secretary and Senior Vice President of General
Electric, has suggested that outside directors should have counsel to assist them. Mr. Estes
believes that counsel could provide significant assistance to outside directors as they attempt
to deal with such complex matters as economic measurements of performance, accounting
standards, environmental performance, occupational health and safety performance, pension
legislation, and the structures of anti-trust law. However, he opposes the idea of a special
staff for outside directors on the ground that it would be divisive. Estes, supra note 2, at 128-
31.
73 Barr, The Role of the Professional Director, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1976, at 18;
Conversation, supra note 45, at 48. The outside director should be put in the position where
he spends a good deal of time at his job as a director, but not so much time that he is
identified with management. See Vagts, The Governance of the Corporation: The Options
Available and the Power to Prescribe, 31 Bus. LAw. 929, 932 (1976).
7, Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 385-86. The board of Texas Instruments, Inc. has attracted
considerable attention. The TI board has as members the Chairman and the President and
three categories of directors; general directors, officers of the board, and directors. The second
title refers to employees who devote the principal amount of their time to their duties as
directors. The general directors devote at least 30 days a year and receive in compensation
$30,000. The directors make a 15-day commitment for which they receive $15,000. See Mace,
supra note.64, at 36.
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ability to work with others, and broad experience.""
The notion of broad experience has begun to take on a political conno-
tation, that is, that the board should in some sense "represent" the society
at large. Indeed, some critics argue that directors should be appointed to
represent certain constituencies, such as minorities and women. This pro-
posal is widely opposed, however, in the business world 8 on the ground
that such constituency directors cannot most effectively promote the de-
velopment of the total enterprise.
7
1
In 1977, a commission on "industrial democracy" issued the Bullock
Report, which urged substantial reform on the boards of British compa-
nies. The Report recommended that there be unitary boards (2x+y) with
equal numbers of union and shareholder representatives (2x), who together
would choose a set- number of outside directors (y). Participation on the
boards by workers was to be through union channels only and the govern-
ment would spend over £ 3 million to train union activists for service on
the boards." After a season of intense political battling and maneuvering,"'
the Labor Government issued a compromise proposal.
2
Worker participation-either in its original or modified form-is un-
sound and, in any case, antithetical to the traditions of labor-management
relations in the United States." Whether "industrial democracy" is the
wave of the future for this country is, at this point, unclear. But it is
another on the growing list of suggestions for reforming the board of direc-
tors. 4
III. INSTITUTE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANcE
As noted earlier, the proposals for reform are reaching the level of a
flood. They are eclectic and often contradictory. Harold Williams' proposal
for the ideal board has prompted considerable debate which Chairman
Williams says he welcomes. To conduct such a debate in a more institu-
tionalized fashion, however, would be preferable. Today, what we have is
" Business Roundtable, supra note 45, at 2105. See Brown, supra note 26, at 59-60;
Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 15, at 1621.
11 Business Roundtable, supra note 45, at 2106. See Corporate Director's Guidebook,
supra note 15, at 1621.
11 BROWN, supra note 26, at 93-94.
" THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1977, at 74-75, 81-83.
" The Bullock Committee was heavily influenced by the Trades Union Congress. THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 1977, at 109-10. The Confederation of British Industry, on the other
hand, was vigorously opposed to the plan. THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 1977, at 103-04. Neither
faction was willing to compromise. See THE ECONOMIST, May 14, 1977, at 125.
11 The Government issued a white paper which was considerably less radical than the
original Report. The Government preferred voluntary participation plans over a universal
formula, rejected parity (2x) for union representatives and permitted both unitary and two-
tier board structures. See THE ECONOMIST, May 27, 1978, at 77-78.
See Business Roundtable, supra note 45, at 2106-07.
See generally Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond
Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REv. 581 (1978).
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a process whereby government officials make proposals and various mem-
bers of the business community make responses, usually ad hoc and post-
prandial. Mr. Williams had advanced a number of provocative suggestions
regarding corporate governance, all of which plainly call for thoughtful
discussion. But there is no permanent forum in which to initiate and carry
forward that discussion. Nor is Mr. Williams going to be Chairman of the
SEC forever; his successor might disagree strenuously, shift the Commis-
sion's attention elsewhere, or offer proposals of a wholly different nature.
If the objective is effective corporate governance, then how do we train
directors and how do we develop a rational body of law and custom in
which they should operate? The answer is rudimentary: we send them to
school."
The advantages of a school for directors are many. Conceptually, they
would fall into two categories: first, the benefits to be gained from specific
vocational teaching as at any professional school and, second, the incre-
mental development, in a scholarly atmosphere, of a body of corporate
governance jurisprudence.
The school environment creates continuity while building a system of
thought and custom exegetically, particularly where the Socratic method
is employed and scholarly articles are published. In the absence of such
schools, we have been subjected to an episodic development of thought, in
part based on randomly negotiated settlements ("the common law of con-
sent decrees")," together with administrative or legislative fiats-witness
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977-which too often are hastily
conceived.
Law schools teach students how to think like lawyers. A school for
directors would do roughly the same, that is, it would inculcate a sense of
being a director. Independence is the key to being an effective outside
director, and independence is an attitude that can only be instilled; it
cannot be legislated. Independence must be cultivated and developed,
preferably in a scholastic environment centered on the case method that
is currently used in most law and many business schools. The case studies,
naturally enough, would consist of past corporate failures and failings, as
well as successes, combined with discussions of hypothetical extensions
and role-playing.
The issues studied would include: When and for what grounds does a
board remove a chief executive officer? Can bribes or submitting to extor-
tion overseas ever be tolerated? How much knowledge of auditing and
accounting is required to serve on an audit committee and what are its
tasks? To what extent can the board as a whole rely on the work of
committees? How much executive compensation, including perquisites, is
too much? How do you motivate managers, and is a compensation commit-
" See Earle, A Stop at School on the Way to the Boardroom, FORTUNE, June 2, 1979, at
102.
as Cohen, supra note 45, at 838.
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tee necessary? How much time each year, at a minimum, iust an outside
director devote to his job? May he, must he, own stock in the corporation?
From what ranks should directors primarily be drawn? Are full-time out-
side directors necessary or desirable? Should the board undertake a man-
agement audit, that is, appoint an operations committee to rate manage-
ment's performance, or does that go beyond the monitoring function?
What are the telltale signs of management fraud? Is a nominating commit-
tee of outside directors essential to avoid self-perpetuating oligarchies?
How does a board balance its desire that the corporation be a "good citi-
zen" with the desire of the shareholders for profits when those two interests
appear to collide?
At the same time, the directors' schools would be forging new ideas and
shaping old ones into the "law" governing the role of directors generally.
Such schools would develop "a theory of the board of directors"." The
curriculum would encompass the major current issues underlying the sub-
ject, e.g., Arthur Goldberg's suggestion that directors have staff; the labell-
ing concept identifying management, affiliated non-management, and
unaffiliated non-management directors; the validity and cost effectiveness
of overview committees, particularly within the boards of smaller compa-
nies; whether the board should have its own counsel or designated
"officer"; whether a conflict of interest exists when a director sits on the
boards of two companies one of which is contemplating a takeover of the
other; whether some sort of public or group representation is appropriate,
either through a public issues committee as at General Electric or more
directly; plus all of the comprehensive questions involved in giving direc-
tion to a complex business enterprise. Classes in independence could prof-
itably draw analogies to the role of the outside auditor, explaining the
importance of the appearance as well as the fact of independence.
Over time, as the curriculum is expanded and refined, as experience
with the educational process deepens and after more and more directors
graduate, a consensus will gradually emerge answering or sharpening many
of the various questions that have been posed by Mr. Williams and others,
as well as those that are as yet unasked. That consensus would naturally
evolve from the give and take between the students and faculty and, in
turn, as the matriculated directors got on the job. Such a consensus might
occasionally be stimulated or even created by articles on leading-edge
subjects. The law of privacy, by way of comparison, essentially originated
in a law review article written at the turn of the century. 8
Professional schools for directors should be established at two or three
major universities around the country primarily on the basis of private
funding, with tuition paid by those companies sponsoring candidates.
They could be adjuncts to the business and law schools at those universi-
ties and be called, for example, Institutes of Corporate Governance. These
': Eells, Foreword to C. BROWN, PUTrrING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK xxiii (1976).
" See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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institutes could make use of the existing university faculties by giving
intensive two to five week courses over the summer. The faculty would be
selected from the business and law schools on campus, augmented by
visiting distinguished lecturers from all fields, including business and gov-
ernment. The institutes could issue degrees for candidates successfully
completing the course.
Recruitment of the student body would work essentially as the selection
of directors does today, except that, when Company A invited the chair-
man of Company B to serve on its board, the new member would enroll at
the nearest institute at Company A's expense. Both companies, as time
permitted, would send along their sitting directors as well. Two weeks or
ten days of instruction would be the minimum, even for experienced direc-
tors. A series of additional one-week courses would be available depending
on the candidate's background and areas of interest. One asks a great deal
of a busy executive, prominent lawyer, or tenured professor to give up part
of a summer, and of their respective employers to donate the director's
time. But even our existing, limited body of seasoned and sophisticated
outside directors could profit from such instruction. Many of these direc-
tors were severely taxed during the questionable payments saga. This time
commitment is analogous to the continuing education requirements now
imposed by most professions, and is a comparatively small extension of the
public service already performed by those organizations whose key employ-
ees sit on the boards of others.
The Parker School of International Law at Columbia, the School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown and the schools for trial judges, trial law-
yers, and state governors have all been successful. Even more similar to
this proposal is the Advanced Management Program offered by the Gradu-
ate School of Business Administration at Harvard University. The Pro-
gram, which is for senior executives, runs for thirteen weeks, either with a
fall and spring session in one year or a summer session over two years.
Similarly, the Harvard Business School offers an International Senior
Managers Program, an eight-week program for senior-level executives from
around the world on the problems of international business. If these exam-
ples can succeed and even flourish, there is no reason why Institutes of
Corporate Governance cannot as well. Indeed, if the idea were to catch on,
the waiting lists would soon be long. 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Much has been said about the animosity in the public mind toward the
business community. However unfair some of that attitude may be, it is
" In June, 1977, Stanley Sporkin, Director of Enforcement of the SEC, suggested that
perhaps directors should be sent to school. See Metzenbaum Hearings, supra note 5, at 94-
96. Two months earlier, on April 20, 1977, this author made the same suggestion, as outlined
above, in a speech in London on the responsibility of outside directors, sponsored by the
International Bar Association.
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attributable in part to the "private fiefdom" form of corporate rule that
was once so prevalent. Some of those chief executives, of course, made
enormous contributions to their particular organizations, whether as a
result of invention, innovation, vision, leadership, or the like. Only a truly
disinterested leader, however, can identify and reasonably accommodate
all of the ways in which his or her corporation affects the various communi-
ties in which it exists. The days of one-man domination ("his board") are
numbered and, in most cases already ended. Their demise should reduce
the temptations leading to management fraud or excessive pressure on
outside auditors and counsel.
Corporate governance and corporate accountability are thus issues
whose time has come. Given their importance to our way of life, surely
their continued examination must be accomplished in a more systematic
way. If Institutes of Corporate Governance are not feasible, then perhaps
there is some other solution. The commercially oriented directors' newslet-
ters, checklists, and seminars that lately have become popular are not the
answer. Something is needed both to train directors in a comprehensive
and serious manner-to establish a whole profession, a discipline-and in
the process develop the policies and customs governing their responsibili-
ties. What is ultimately at stake, in no small measure, is the viability and
legitimacy of corporate self-regulation or, even more generally, that of the
private sector itself.
Only twenty years have passed since the London Times published an
advertisement for a "titled person required to add distinction to the board
of directors of a wine company." And even today in the United States there
are still some fiefdoms that have survived the aftermath of Watergate. It
may not be that full-time professional directors are necessary, but it is time
for directors who are professionals.
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